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“‘DUALISM: Pythagoras said that all things were divisible into two genera, good and evil; in the 
genus of  good things he classified all perfect things such as light, males, repose, and so forth, 
whereas in the genus of  evil he classified darkness, females, and so forth’ 
 (Thomas Aquinas, ‘On the Power of  Good,’ p.84) 
Promethean aspiration: To be a woman and a Pythagorean. What is the communal vision of  poetry 
if  you are curved, odd, indefinite, irregular, feminine. … First I find myself  a Slave, next I 
understand my slavery, finally I re-discover myself  at liberty inside the confines of  known necessity. 
Gun goes on thinking of  the violence done to meaning. Gun watches herself  watching.”  
- from My Emily Dickinson by Susan Howe 
“She knew well enough the vast cold apparatus of  civilization, and what contact with it meant; and 
how difficult it was to evade.”  
- from “Sun” by D.H. Lawrence 
“I am an instrument in the shape / of  a woman trying to translate pulsations / into images   for the 
relief  of  the body / and the reconstruction of  the mind.” 





 In 1949 Simone de Beauvoir asked the woman question. The answer she came to—the 
question, of  course: what on earth is a woman?—was that the category of  woman denoted a 
permanent cultural Other, always constituted in reference to the permanent cultural Absolute, man. 
The Garden of  Eden need not be re-spun into a feminist vindication of  the snake because it already 
tells a cultural truth: an all powerful masculine force makes man in its image, gives him an integrated, 
unique self-hood, and then draws Eve out of  a piece of  him. As if  Adam had the complexity to 
imply Eve.  
 Unfortunately, that all powerful masculine force, commonly known as patriarchy, convinced 
Eve, herself, otherwise. Why, Beauvoir asks, does woman, whose subjective experience is, of  course, 
her own, and who possesses an Absolute self-hood, exist as Other not only in the external political 
and social realms but, too, in her own head? Why does the female subject conceive, experience, even 
posture itself  as object? She writes,  
The man who sets the woman up as an Other will thus find her in a deep complicity. Hence 
woman makes no claim for herself  as subject because she lacks the concrete means, because 
she senses the necessary link connecting her to man without positing its reciprocity, and 
because she often derives satisfaction from her role as Other (Beauvoir, 30). 
 Acceding to womanhood (the conceiving, experiencing, and posturing of  self  as Other) 
confers access to feminist anthropologist Gayle Rubin’s concept of  the symbolic phallus. Reading 
back into Freud in “The Traffic in Women,” Rubin reframes the embattled Oedipal crisis as a 
phenomenon of  cultural conditioning working within a societal kinship system in which the symbol 
of  the phallus entails the dominance of  men over women. Possessing the phallus is how one holds 
power in this system; if  they wish to be part of  society, women, unable to possess the phallus, must 
access it through a male intermediary. Women become complicit in cultivating and maintaining 
Beauvoir’s “necessary link” with men when “[they] accede to the place of  a woman in a phallic 
exchange network. She can ‘get’ the phallus—in intercourse, or as a [male] child—but only as a gift 
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from a man” (Rubin, 195). Beauvoir frames the same concept—woman’s establishment in the 
“phallic exchange network,” or, society, through men—as a claiming of  “the advantages an alliance 
with the superior caste confers on them” (30). In each construction, woman is complicit in her 
Otherness at the behest of  the carrot and stick (or, perhaps, the positive and negative phallus): 
through the threat of  exclusion from or demotion in society and through the possibility of  
ascension in it.  
 The stakes, then, of  Othering oneself—that is, participating in womanhood, or not—are 
quite high. Thus—not wanting to die—I put on a dress. Contemporary feminism loves to proclaim 
that women practice femininity for themselves and not for men. In the sense that practicing it 
provides a foothold in phallic culture, I suppose I wear the dress for myself, for my survival both 
material and psychic. But it would be self-deception to say I don’t do it for men, that the choice to 
wear clothes I can’t run and dance in is natural, authentic, untouched by patriarchal intervention. 
The self  that I am was hijacked a long time ago and even though she’s smart and she knows that 
someone messed with the code, the algorithm is the algorithm. I put on a dress. I like to put on a 
dress. I look pretty. I survive.  
★  
 Beauvoir elaborates on woman’s Othered status, “[Woman] is defined and differentiated with 
reference to man not he with reference to her; she is the incidental, the inessential as opposed to the 
essential. He is the Subject, he is the Absolute—she is the Other” (16). To be a woman, then, is to 
exist in a state of  permanent alterity. Man is able to live his subjectivity as its subject and takes 
woman as object, while woman is conditioned in such a way that she loses claim to the subject role 
of  her own subjectivity and objectifies herself. The figure of  the prostituted woman, who is doubly 
Othered, can act as a paradigm for understanding the production of  female alterity generally. 
Langston Hughes’ treatment of  the prostituted woman in his poem, “To a Little Lover-Lass, Dead,” 
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from his 1926 collection The Weary Blues enacts the inevitability of  woman’s alterity given culturally 
conditioned male and female subjectivities.  
 “To a Little Lover-Lass, Dead,” describes a prostitute who has died and who, even in death, 
cannot escape the condition of  female alterity. Hughes consistently constructs her in relation to men 
and culturally defined forms of  womanhood, thus limiting either the possibility of, or the reader’s 
access to, her authentic subjectivity. The line break after the first word of  the poem, “She,” neatly 
establishes womanhood as intrinsically Othered, at a remove, for the word itself  becomes a thought; 
“She,” that is, a woman not here, symbolized by proxy. The sentence continues, “She / Who 
searched for lovers / In the night” (Hughes, 13, 1-3) as the speaker once again constructs her 
relationally, this time explicitly in relation to men. (This is the same experience of  the title where our 
very first reference to her is as a “Lover-Lass.” The hyphenation makes the bond between the 
“Lover” and “Lass” intractable, as well as essential to her condition, though not to his. It is the 
“Lover” that comes first and acts upon the “Lass.”) The speaker describes her passing into death 
and follows up with a description of  her new condition: “Now like a little lonely waif  / She 
walks” (Hughes, 13, 8-9). Once again she is described relationally, though here she is positioned 
against a form of  womanhood, rather than against a lover, manhood. The effect remains consistent 
with Beauvoir’s construction, for the woman is still deprived of  a subjectivity of  her own. The 
speaker maps this prefab womanhood—the delicate, unattached waif—onto her, not even giving her 
full purchase on it; she is not “a little lonely waif,” but only like one.  With three lines left in the 1
 French feminist philosopher Luce Irigaray accounts for this comparative structure in her writing on women as 1
commodities: “In order to have a relative value, a commodity has to be confronted with another commodity that serves as 
its equivalent. Its value is never found to lie within itself. … Its value is transcendent to itself. … The likeness here is only a 
measure expressing the fabricated character of  the commodity, its transformation by man’s (social, symbolic) 
‘labor’” (Irigaray, 176-7). In this case, the “little lonely waif ” is the strain of  female “fabricated character” that constitutes 
the woman in the poem’s value, or objectified selfhood, or commodity status. Additionally, the three kinds of  social 
commodity status’ that Irigaray lays out for women are the virgin, mother, and, relevantly, the prostitute. Each of  these 
roles represents a certain quality of  relation among men; in the case of  the prostitute, she is “usage [or use value] that is 
exchanged” among men (Irigaray, 186). Where the virgin is pure exchange value and the mother is pure use value, the 
prostitute occupies both of  these roles, hence her doubly Othered status. 
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poem, she is still an empty space defined by adjacency and proxy and lacking affirmed internal 
qualities.  
 The final lines of  the poem, which entail the final act of  othering, ask both the lover-lass’ 
and speaker’s role in her lack of  subjectivity, as well as calling attention to the speaker’s relationship 
to her. Hughes writes, “She walks / An endless street / And gives her kiss to nothingness. / Would 
God his lips were sweet!” (13, 9-12). The giving of  the kiss is the most active verb associated with 
her in the poem (“She / who searches,” “She / … has gone,” “She walks”), yet even in her strongest 
moment of  subjecthood, right at the border between life and death where one might imagine the 
possibility for disruption of  her previous state, she fulfills a classic act of  prescribed womanhood: to 
give, and, in particular, to give sexually. As a prostitute this was her public mode of  engagement; 
even in the privacy of  death she still only moves in the public mode she did in life. If  the poem 
ended at “nothingness” this moment might allow the possibility of  a reclamation of  the self, one 
forced by the disjunction between her public mode and the intrinsic privacy of  death:  “[she] gives 
her kiss to nothingness,” or, “she does not give her kiss.” The choice of  “nothingness” over 
“nothing” is the first interruption to this possibility, for the former is more material, a quality, while 
the latter is conceptual. The materiality of  “nothingness” primes it to become the deathly absolute 
she is Other to and the speaker crystallizes this by gendering (male) and anthropomorphizing 
nothingness. Why does he do this? 
 To answer this we turn to the relationship between the speaker and lover-lass and note a 
certain tenderness in his treatment of  her. The descriptor “little” and the euphemizing of  her death 
as “[going] the quiet way” (Hughes, 13, 4) impart this sense. The center of  this effect, however, 
seems to be the first word of  the title—“To”—which, while easy to overlook is, in fact, the premise 
of  the poem: it’s directed toward the woman. This bolsters a sense of  intimacy between her and the 
speaker in its evocation of  letter writing or, specifically, love letters, and we see this subtle intimacy 
again in the last line as the speaker centers on a very nuanced element of  the woman’s subjective 
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experience, the taste of  another’s lips, suggesting that attempting to discern her side of  a sexual 
experience may be a mode of  thought he has engaged in previously. In this way the possibility that 
he was her lover emerges. 
 A number of  implications follow from this. For one, we see the speaker opening space for 
consideration of  her experience, or the possibility of  her subjectivity, both implicitly and explicitly. 
The premise of  address entails this in that the poem is directed toward her which allows her a level 
of  personhood she doesn’t have otherwise: to write something to someone presumes they have a 
subjectivity with which to apprehend it. The concern with her side of  a sexual experience in one 
respect does the same, but the coincidence of  that moment with the gendering and 
anthropomorphizing of  death, or the establishment of  her new male absolute, complicates things. 
The exclamative nature of  that line as compared to the descriptive nature of  the rest of  the poem 
seems to, in fact, center the speaker’s subjectivity in the way that exclamation serves an impulsive 
need to externalize one’s internal state. Even in wishing her well, the speaker cannot escape the pull 
of  his (male) subjectivity and ends up perpetrating it on her, dooming her to an eternity of  alterity. 
As the last line of  the poem it centers maleness both in the exclamative property and the content of  
the line. The speaker’s particular maleness also comes into question; we can read him as her lover 
and perceive a certain tenderness in his treatment of  her but, given the circumstances of  her life, 
reading him as one of  those lovers in the night is perhaps more correct. This seems increasingly 
possible in consideration of  the remove at which he describes her, as well as the particulars of  the 
information he has about her. All we know, and so all we know he knows, is that she was a prostitute 
and that she has died, knowledge a previous sexual solicitor would jump to more characteristically 
than that which a lover would. 
 The particular character of  the speaker’s maleness is not, however, what is ultimately at stake, 
but instead the relation between a paradigmatic womanhood and manhood.  The juxtaposition of  2
 Whatever variety of  expressions womanhood and manhood take on they are still a center and a periphery.2
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the premise of  address against the relentlessly othering poem entails a recognition of  the alterity of  
womanhood, and in particular, prostituted womanhood. Whether this awareness resides in active, if  
flawed, intervention and consideration on the part of  a lover, or blind enactment on the part of  a 
solicitor, both the male and female subjectivities (or lack thereof) propel the woman further into 
alterity by nature of  their construction. 
 The absolute evacuation of  the prostitute’s subjectivity of  course functions on a symbolic 
level just as her double alterity acts as the symbol for a general female alterity. It is not that women 
do not have a subjectivity—each individual woman is literally the subject of  her own life and 
experiences it from the subject position—but that that subjectivity conceptualizes itself  as object. 
Beauvoir writes that “Women’s drama” is in the conflict between these two psychic phenomena; that 
is, between “the fundamental claim of  every subject, which always posits itself  as essential, and the 
demands of  a situation that constitutes her as inessential” (37) to herself  and to others. “To a Little 
Lover-Lass Dead” enacts and dramatizes those demands and their consequences.  
★ 
 Beauvoir’s foundational analysis would plant many of  the seeds for the the second wave of  
feminism, or the Women’s Liberation Movement, which was at its height during the 1960s and 70s 
and which launched a thousand radical feminist theorists. Women met in consciousness raising 
groups to discuss the sufferings of  their lives and soon found that the personal was political, that all 
their many embarrassments and pains and failures and wounds did not belong to them but to a 
malicious, predatory patriarchal system stretching back to the beginning of  human history. The 
discipline of  Women’s Studies was born and women turned patriarchy’s analytic, probing, invasive 
lens against itself, undertaking for the first time a systemic, collective account of  the burdens women 
had shouldered individually for centuries.  
 My feminist consciousness was raised slowly and then all at once when I was a junior in high 
school. I’d always called myself  a feminist but it wasn’t until a friend introduced me to radical 
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feminist theory—the product of  that same 70s tide—that I learned what that meant, or what it 
could mean. I knew I was hitting on something large when I came across a Margaret Atwood quote 
that made the stakes that I’d only been able to conceptualize abstractly at that point feel quite 
immediate. Atwood writes,  
Male fantasies, male fantasies, is everything run by male fantasies? Up on a pedestal or down 
on your knees, it's all a male fantasy: that you're strong enough to take what they dish out, or 
else too weak to do anything about it. Even pretending you aren't catering to male fantasies 
is a male fantasy: pretending you're unseen, pretending you have a life of  your own, that you 
can wash your feet and comb your hair unconscious of  the ever-present watcher peering 
through the keyhole, peering through the keyhole in your own head, if  nowhere else. You 
are a woman with a man inside watching a woman. You are your own voyeur (433-4) 
In my experience disseminating this quote to any woman who will listen, it resonates painfully and 
immediately simply because of  how correct it is. The feminist implications are secondary to the way 
you feel like Atwood has just done anthropology inside your particular head. When I moved past 
that initial shock and began to try to draw a feminist program out of  it, I read it through the filter of  
the culturally popular liberal feminism I was mostly aware of  at the time and that has been 
displacing radical feminism nearly since its genesis. This is the feminism that would argue my choice 
to wear a dress is feminist simply because I chose it. “You can’t win!” this feminism would use this 
quote to argue; “it’s all a male fantasy,” so just do what makes you happy. As Beauvoir’s and Rubin’s 
analyses evidence, however, and Hughes’ poem renders, the patriarchal trappings of  that choice are 
the reasons it makes me happy and they are so deeply engrained in my selfhood as to constitute it. 
What makes me happy is to a certain extent (and a deeper one than many women are willing to 
admit to themselves) what makes the patriarchy happy. I am an agent of  my own oppression—I am 
my “own voyeur”—and of  other women’s, even if  only by example: womanhood is a social disease. 
As a feminist, I’m not content to let agents of  women’s oppression roam free, so I’d like to kill the 
man inside. Or, more accurately, I’d like to kill my own womanhood, which is only constituted by or 
does not exist except in the capacity of  reaction to the man inside. In my feminist vision, women 
drag the entrails of  womanhood (and concomitantly, manhood) through the streets.  
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“Feminism is a suicide pact” 
 “explain” 
 “We kill Woman” 
  - Text messages exchanged June 2018 
★ 
 My consciousness is raised more every day as I catch echoes of  the patriarchy and of  
patriarchal conditioning in all the marrow of  the world—my own, obviously, included. At the same 
time, I cannot abdicate from this infected world. The radicalized woman’s experience is 
fundamentally one of  dissonance. She exists simultaneously along two metrics of  truth: a righteous, 
feminist metric that exposes violent patriarchal power dynamics in the material and conceptual 
functionings of  society; and the status-conferring, phallic culture’s metric which has immediate 
material and psychic implications for her life. The radicalized woman is suspended between these 
two metrics, unable to deny the purchase either of  them has on her and all of  our realities. 
 In this state of  suspension, paralysis, I take ten selfies. The best one—the prettiest and most 
simultaneously alluring and withholding—I post and caption “All men are pigs.” I check my 
notifications obsessively until the tall, arrogant boy likes it. I revel in feminism—its art and language 
and academia and culture—in the same breath that I imagine myself  through the eyes of  men, 
reveling. I revel, paralyzed. I revel in place. I climb the lifeguard tower, transcending culture, “up on 
a pedestal” (Atwood). “Women / should be / pedestals / moving / pedestals / moving / to the / 
motions / of  men” (Swenson, “Women”). I jump off  the tower but I don’t fall and I don’t fly. It’s 
golden hour and it feels like the sun will always be in my eyes. 
 Whether this is true, whether I will always be caught between my feminist perceptions and 
patriarchal realities, to concede it, to acquiesce to the stringencies of  the phallic culture metric even 
as my understanding of  its inner workings grows, would be to abandon myself  and so to abandon 
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feminism.  The problem I now face is that, like Hughes’ lover-lass, my authentic subjectivity, 3
meaning who I would’ve been if  not for patriarchy, doesn’t exist. I don’t know how to not acquiesce. 
Audre Lorde writes, “the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house” (“Master’s Tools,” 
2) and I, unfortunately, am both his tool and house. Attempts to think myself  out of  patriarchy 
through the problem-solving patterns and codes I have learned in my life will be insufficient because 
they themselves are built out of  patriarchy. The master’s house is kingdom come. If  these 
prescriptive thought patterns are, on an internal level, what keep me in womanhood and what 
channel my attempts to subvert it back upon themselves, perhaps learning to engage around or 
within or in spite of  prescription is one method of  liberation. If  I actively override the elements of  
female social conditioning that will respond to brute force—teach myself  how to stop performing 
feminine aesthetics, refuse to do emotional labor for men, etc.—and cultivate a certain free-flowing, 
anti-prescriptive practice that seeks to move a little more adeptly, and a little more accurately, than 
patriarchal thought patterns can, maybe I can concurrently account for and dismantle the more 
insidious, invisible elements of  conditioned womanhood, too. Who I, and all women, would’ve been 
if  not for patriarchy doesn’t exist and never will, but who we could be in spite of  it—perhaps—has 
a fighting chance.  
★ 
  
 I feel a responsibility to the women around me to make it easier for them to disobey patriarchy by disobeying it myself. 3
Every time I’m a bitch or I don’t shave or I prioritize women over men I make it easier for them to do those things too. 
As womanhood is a social disease, liberation is a social medicine. 
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Incidental Poetics 
 Poetics is the native world of  anti-prescriptive thinking. It can be made to respond to or act 
through prescriptive models in both its writing and analysis: you can write in meter and use unique 
and evocative but accessible metaphors and someone else can read your poem through theory and 
metrical analysis and lyrical analysis and investigate etymology and take it literally—or not, as it 
demands—and read it well. And then I can take your poem and I can truly fuck it up. I can make it 
resonant with the way I brushed my teeth this morning. I can ignore every other word. I won’t do 
those things without cause—some might, but I pledge that I won’t—but I’ll do them for cause more 
precise and enlightening and adept than any prescribed model can offer.  
 I struggled for much of  the course of  this project to allow myself  to read in the anti-
prescriptive attitude that poetry asks of  its reader and that I’m capable of. Feminist theory 
overdetermined my readings of  poems that I could’ve read for their play with language, or their 
resonance with how I brushed my teeth (my reading of  Hughes is an example of  prescriptively 
reading a poem through feminism, but the anti-prescriptive mode means knowing when to use 
determination, too). The way that womanhood and patriarchy are totalizing systems, similarly my 
knowledge of  feminist theory became totalizing; thus, breaking totalizing thought patterns became 
both the theoretical and functional stakes of  the project. In trying to find a way out of  both of  these 
systems I thought: what about a randomized poetics? An incidental poetics? Can I use an anti-
prescriptive premise of  poetics to, in one motion, write a liberated project and work toward a 
liberated womanhood? 
★ 
 On Sunday I cut open a pomegranate and spent 45 minutes mining it. I was wearing my new 
silk dress (danger and energy in every red pearl) and I felt antiquitous and special and primal and 
juice staining my hands which symbolically became blood. I’d say I felt like a regular Dionysian: 
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pomegranate drunkenness, murdering men with impunity. My peers could not touch me from the 
outpost of  modernity they’d been exiled to.  
 Emerging from my hallowed, ancient, golden room and my silken, red reverie to discard the 
hollowed pomegranate skins, I was met with a brimming dorm trash can; at the very top, a dark red 
pomegranate skin. Because I can take criticism I laughed and felt I should write a poem.  
 In the case of  having your individuality contested by old fruit, Emily Dickinson suggests: 
“Did you ever read one of  her Poems backward, because the plunge from the front overturned you? 
I sometimes (often have, many times) have - A something overtakes the Mind” (Dickinson 
Electronic Archives). Having plunged, the trashed pomegranate overturned a pruned self-image.  4
Reading that pruning backwards, rotting pomegranate-tinted glasses as my optic, not of  choice, but 
of  incident, indeed my Mind was overtaken. I giggled to myself  and sent off  a funny little tweet 
about the experience. I came away a better person.  
 I’d like to continue to come away a better person and I don’t trust myself, as a worse person 
than I will be when I come away, to prescribe that path. American Hybrid: A Norton Anthology of  New 
Poetry has on its cover a butterfly in lemon-lime, one wing rounded and yellow with brown dots 
along its edge, the other angular and green with a single red dot that reminds me of  the Japanese 
flag. The lemonylimey insect brandishes an American flag. I have an affinity for poetry and 
butterflies so last year when I came upon this book on a library shelf  I did not open it but I did 
bring it home.  
 There are, according to the blurb, more than seventy New American Poets represented in 
these pages, spanning an accumulated 508 pages of  poetry and light biographical information. Like 
myself, American Hybrid seeks to undo or resist traditional ways of  thinking poetry by taking account 
of  a newly rhizomatic poetic culture in American literature where, as Cole Swensen writes in the 
book’s introduction, 
 Poet Rae Armantrout writes, “There's no good segue back from Dickinson” (Electronic Poetry Center).4
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Some nodes may be extremely experimental, and some extremely conservative, but many of  
them are true intersections of  these extremes, so that the previous adjectives—well-made, 
decorous, traditional, formal, and refined, as well as spontaneous, immediate, bardic, 
irrational, translogical, open-ended, and ambiguous—all still apply, but in new combinations 
(xxv). 
American Hybrid is a Norton trying to un-Norton itself, or a canon trying to un-canon itself, just as I 
am a woman trying to un-woman herself. My un-program program, working within the pages of  this 
un-Norton Norton, will be to generate approximately five random numbers between one and 508 
and undertake an analysis of  the five resulting poems. We will see who each of  us is on the other 
side, in the future.  
★ 
 Rules of  Incidental Poem Selection: 
i. I will use a random number generator ranging from 1-508. 
ii. I will select the first poem to begin on the corresponding page. If  no poem begins on this page 
I will select the poem that appears on that page. If  no poem appears on that page I will generate 
a new number. 
iii. If  the number generated corresponds with a poem by a male poet I will generate again until it 
does not. This is my favorite rule. 
iv. I will generate as I go. This describes both a psychic state I am aiming for and a mechanical 
operation. I will not generate all of  the page numbers in one sitting, but will go poem by poem.  
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 I have already broken a rule, but I have broken it through perfect incident and I will not be 
rectifying the mistake. I almost feel like I haven’t broken a rule and, instead, as if  the universe has 
shifted by just a degree recently so as to syncopate my relationship with Jane Miller which up until 
this moment was nearly too correct.  Yesterday I generated the number 274 and was greeted by Ms. 
Miller who fully endeared herself  to me by line 13 of  the Norton’s first excerpt from A Palace of  
Pearls: “I can’t remember enough I make shit up” (Miller, 275). Today I have opened the Norton to 
find that this text in fact begins on page 275 and page 274 is biography—I am directly in violation 
of  Rule ii.  
 Here’s the thing. I’m certain that yesterday this was not true. Little elves have changed things 
in the night but I don’t answer to little elves. I can’t remember enough I make shit up. Jane and I are 
already far too entangled to part ways now, not in the least because her poem makes mention of  
both Federico García Lorca and the pomegranate, two actors who have already played significant 
roles in the genesis of  this project. Randomness itself  can be prescriptive; trying to achieve a perfect 
arbitrariness would just be another form of  algorithm. Incident clears space for the happenstance—
a human randomness where my brain can alight before I do. 
 Miller is slightly manically watching and experimenting with where and how the brain alights 
too. An anxiety permeates the poem and takes the form of  things continually undoing each other as 
the speaker searches for, not just stable ground, but the correct stable ground. The result, of  course, is 
instability. Lacking the tools and anxious about lacking the tools, the speaker flits between different 
modes of  truth access that complicate or undo each other. The sonic redundancy of  the first words 
of  the poem—“Lightning lights the moon’s shroud” (Miller, 275, 1) signals the concern with 
truthful representation. Avoiding the possibility of  misrepresenting through device, instead the 
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speaker chooses a verb already contained in its subject: the thing does as the thing is: in doing so she 
abdicates from the representational responsibility of  the poet and allows language to determine 
itself.  
 It is the inconsistency of  representational tacks that characterizes the poem, however, and 
the following lines immediately unsettle this approach. The result is a hesitance about any approach. 
Miller writes, “the surface of  my body is excited / like sharp stabs of  emotion in love” (275, 2-3). 
These lines are a simile comprised of  two metaphors, the effect of  which is to produce an immense 
distance between the representation and its object. Metaphor as a tool indeed distances from 
material reality but tends toward conveying an experiential reality that material description may not 
encompass. In this case the proliferation of  metaphor works against itself  to obscure whatever 
broader truth of  experience the simile is trying to pay respect to. The feeling of  “surface” is 
represented as the feeling of  “sharp stabs,” an oxymoronic comparison that doesn’t justify itself  past 
the fact of  its occurrence. Simile doesn’t require obvious parity between its two objects but it can be 
defused by mutual exclusivity. What’s important is that it is not the experience itself  that is 
oxymoronic but the particularities of  the speaker’s choice of  metaphors. The original 
representational object—the way her body feels—is inaccessible behind the many layers of  
representation that, accumulated, make nonsense of  each other. The clumsiness of  meaning this 
produces is nearly directly opposite to the clumsiness of  the first line which loses itself  in a lack of  
intervention as compared to these lines which lose themselves in over-intervention. Enacting how 
quickly attempts at representation can deteriorate, three lines into the poem and the dangers that 
attend the possibilities of  language have already reared their heads. Implicitly, Miller shows her 
attunement to the fact that holding too tightly to any one possibility, any one tool, dulls its edge.  
 This dulling through overuse or extremity is connected to a suspicion about the efficacy of  
art. Miller writes, “the bond of  physiognomy a child’s distant melodic greeting / by all accounts 
sketchy lest I make too much of  them” (275, 16-17). These lines need some decoding. Miller pairs 
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the “bond of  physiognomy,” that is, the logical link that says the external is representative of  the 
internal, or that reads the external as a symbol of  the internal, with “a child’s distant melodic 
greeting.” It’s intuitive to read these lines as figuring the bond in terms of  the greeting but Miller has 
a habit of  punctuation-less sentence or clause breaks in the middle of  lines; given the plural “them” 
in the following line it seems likely these two entities are being listed rather than related (the list is a 
kind of  relationship, too). The pretty oblique categorizing of  the physiognomic bond with the child’s 
greeting is given justification through the self-admonition, “sketchy lest I make too much of  them.” 
This encouragement to tread lightly tracks well with physiognomy which is a pseudoscience; the 
child’s greeting is slightly more oblique but constellating it with the inner/outer structure that is at 
play in these lines gives it some standing. Children are pretty undiscerning with their attention as 
they bump up against the world and learn it through feedback; a child’s greeting is likely less a 
reflection on the person being greeted than on the child’s experimentation with the world. The 
through line of  this thought, then, is if  these things are taken too seriously, held onto too tightly, 
they fall apart—that is, failure through extremity, dulling through overuse.  This is helpful but we 
should take care to not forget that at stake here is not the quality of  extremity but the status of  art, 
or the speaker’s shifting understanding of  the status of  art; “sketchy,” the alternative to “making too 
much” provides our way in.  
 “Sketchy” is quite a multivalent word. It denotes the preliminary, the hesitant, the suspicious, 
and, of  course, the literal artistic sketch. “Sketchy” seems to be the model the poem enacts; an art 
that is hesitant about its efficacy, suspicious of  art itself, and so, having learned the lesson of  
extremity, ends up only committing halfway to its own project. Miller writes, “thinking is only ever 
provisional / this is what I think now that we are both alone” (275, 11-2). These lines form a 
paradox wherein the identification of  “thinking is only ever provisional” as a thought calls into 
doubt its own sentiment—that thinking is provisional—but that doubt is founded on the sentiment 
that is now being called into doubt. These lines seem to be the reductio ad absurdum of  a sketchy 
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model of  poetry or art, where hesitance becomes so central it turns on itself—a hesitance about 
hesitance—and even any soft, preliminary, sketchy attempts at meaning, stemming from an anxiety 
about getting it right, lose themselves in the land of  circularity.  
 Does the poem offer any resistance to this self-defeating sketchiness? Where much of  the 
lyric is self-reflexive or explicitly meditating on art, almost all of  the excerpts in the Norton end with 
a capitalized line that seems to be operating on a different, more mythic landscape (almost closer to 
a literalized Palace of  Pearls) and with a distinct tone. These lines are as follows: 
 “A FOOT SOLDIER SEIZED IN SIGHT OF HIS OWN SQUADRON” (Miller, 275, 22) 
 “PLEASE CALL FOR SEVERAL HUNDRED THOUSAND PHYSICIANS / 
QUICKLY” (Miller, 276, 9-10) 
 “CHERRIES BLUEBERRIES WHITE PEACHES AND LIMES” (Miller, 278, 51) 
 “BE CAREFUL OF MURDERERS IN A PALACE OF PEARLS” (Miller, 279, 34) 
It’s tempting—or at least I am tempted—to read these lines as an easy alternate mode to the 
vacillating quality of  the rest of  the lyric. The conclusive take on this poem would be “The 
Immediacy of  War and Fruit” where war and fruit are each directly confrontational experiences, 
unbound by representation, and so the idealized poem should operate by their logic. This synthesis 
falls apart upon inspection in about 14 directions, not the least of  which being my absurdly 
representationally bound experience with the pomegranate, discussed earlier. Centrally, it falls apart 
within the logic of  the poem, too, which plays elements of  the uncommitting reflections against 
themselves in these capitalized lines. Miller writes in excerpt 22, “history is the last thing poems 
should tell / and stories next to last so poetry is all / a scent of  berry like a splash of  destiny / 
which hints at the best of  life” (277, 38-40). This excerpt is, of  course, the one that ends 
“CHERRIES BLUEBERRIES WHITE PEACHES AND LIMES”—a scent of  berry, indeed. 
Rather than representing an alternative, in this case the capitalized line reads as perhaps a repressed 
reversal of  the professed position of  the poem (instructed, “scent of  berry,” one’s mind eventually 
rebels in the opposite direction) or as a comment on the insufficiency of  language which cannot, as 
loudly as it yells, conjure a scent of  berry, anything real.  
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 In the final analysis, the tool that remains workable for Miller is not to sketch or to yell; she 
does both those things, and others, and they take each other and themselves apart. The central 
operation of  the poem is, in fact, to take apart and the mode in which she does this is humor. “Do 
you know how long it has been since a moral choice presented itself  / and the wrong choice was 
made / not two minutes” (Miller, 276, 1-3), excerpt 4 begins. Humor relies on the incongruent and 
contradictory for its edge. Language doesn’t allow for stable, congruent representation, the poem 
enacts, and humor drags a neon highlighter over the fact of  the instability, unconcerned by object. In 
this sense it offers the most direct line of  communication between speaker and audience, and offers 
salience in the failures and cracks.  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Incidental Poem Number Two: excerpt from To Be in a Time of  War by Etel Adnan 
Generation Sequence: 
page 7 
 Page 7. I raise my eyebrows. Then I psychically raise my eyebrows at my eyebrow raise; why 
am I expecting randomness to middle? Unless that is the case—the Bell Curve? There are more 
numbers in the middle than at either end. Yes, okay. I nod my head to my grandmother the electrical 
engineer. Lately I’ve been saying I come from scientists and feminists (I’ve even made a Spotify 
playlist by that title. My friend Sam says, “Playlists as autofiction”). Do my origins show? I’m writing 
a numerically generated project and my one intervention has been to nix the men. Maybe they show 
too much. 
 Page 7. Oh no. “Etel?” Etel could be a man. Let Etel be a man. Proof. Let Etel be a man. 
When Etel is a man, Isabel generates a new number, n. Let n be any poem other than this horrifying 
mass of  text on page 7. I’m being dramatic. It’s just…what am I to do with this??  
 This excerpt from To Be in a Time of  War by Etel Adnan, woman, takes the role of  the 
infinitive to its logical limit. Five unbroken paragraphs of  text compose the poem. Each of  these 
paragraphs is composed of  a comma divided list of  actions: “To look at the watch, the clock, the 
alarm clock, to listen to the ticking, to think about it to look again, to go to the tap, to open the 
refrigerator, to close it, to open the door, …” (Adnan, 6, 9-11). Let Etel be a woman. Let her not 
waver from this litany once.  
 I’ve been analyzing my allergy to this poem and, predictably, it’s coming from exactly the 
overdetermining tick that I’m trying to break. The way I instinctively see it there are two tacks: go 
hard for the intricacies of  the poem, investigating the particularities of  “to distinguish the roses 
from the hyacinths” (Adnan, 6, 34) and “to thank graciously” (Adnan, 7, 50) for whatever 
conceptual resonances I can unfurl; or go hard for the form, thinking about the innate character of  
the infinitive in its relation to war—how it does not specify time nor place nor actor; how it 
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dislocates as war does. Is there perhaps a middle path that neither homogenizes the poem as a 
reflection on a verb form nor asks too much of  its granularity? No, really—I’m asking.  
  Adnan seems to be asking about the relationship between self  and action. War alienates self  
from action, or sets new terms for the relationship between self  and action: the soldier is celebrated 
for things he  would normally be imprisoned for; “war effort” calls for all of  society to involve, to 5
act, but by function of  that universality the action becomes tangential for most, either obliquely 
related to the war or executed somewhere geographically distant from the original actor. The 
program one undertakes, then, “To wake up, to stretch, to get out of  bed, to dress, to stagger toward 
the window” (Adnan, 6, 31-2), indiscriminately loses its sense of  native relationship to the actor who 
undertakes it. This seems to be the operating condition of  wartime for Adnan, so that even when 
the program is painfully authentic and personal, “to be ecstatic about the garden’s beauty,” (Adnan, 
6, 33), it is still a part of  the war function. 
 To constellate war, self, and math (which is how we began this reflection). 
  Bernard Chazelle in his 2006 article, “Could Your iPod Be Holding the Greatest Mystery in 
Modern Science?” in the journal Math Horizons explains things in terms I can understand. He writes, 
“Separating control (the hardware) from program (the software) was the major insight of  Alan Turing
—well, besides this little codebreaking thing he did in Bletchley Park that helped win World War II. 
The separation was the key to universality” (14-15). In this sense, Adnan’s poem is a transcript of  
software, and a gesture toward a spectral hardware, a self, present in its absence. The universalizing 
quality of  war, war effort, is a Turing-esque severing.   6
 I would typically default to the “she” pronoun but war is innate to socially constructed manhood. See chapter 2 of  5
Maria Mies’ Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale, “Social Origins of  the Sexual Divison of  Labor.”
 I’m not fully satisfied with my reading of  this poem. Please see Bernadette Mayer’s poem, “Failures in Infinitives.” 6
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Incidental Poem Number Three: “Chinese Space” by Mei-Mei Berssenbrugge 
Generation Sequence: 
page 58  
 The first thing you should know is that Mei-Mei Berssenbrugge’s poem “Chinese Space” is 
formatted horizontally across two vertical Norton pages. The clause broken by the page division 
“the way the far corner of  the pond becomes a corner again as we approach [PAGE/BREAK] on 
the diagonal, which had been a vanishing point” (Berssenbrugge, 58-9, 19-20), makes good use of  
this. The spine of  the book becomes part of  the poem and we experience the diagonal approach, 
vanishing, and reappearance. Utility is not so much the realm Berssenbrugge is operating in, 
however; rather, a particular quality of  experience is both the object and mode of  the poem. This 
quality is the quality of  Chinese Space (although, I think, a certain tongue-in-cheek-ness should not 
be lost in our reading of  that phrase) and the horizontal orientation  signals that, asking us to 7
reconstitute our expectations of  the space of  a poem and bringing us to expectations of  space more 
broadly.  
 The defining principles of  the poem’s mode of  space are partialness and relationality. The 
poem’s object, the house, is specifically described as “a house we could not wholly / retain in 
memory” (Berssenbrugge, 58, 12-3); the reader is guided through the physical, but conceptually 
loaded, space of  the house through paratactic perspective shifts that are sometimes logically 
followable but often done through oblique conceptual adjacencies. The followable ones often figure 
one element of  the house in terms of  another one and then shift the object through paratactic 
additions from the first element to the once only relational second. Berssenbrugge writes, 
 The eye expecting to confront static space experiences a lavish range of  optical events, 
 such as crickets in Ming jars, their syncopation like the right, then left, then right progress 
 into the house, an experience that cannot be sustained in consciousness, because 
 your movement itself  binds passing time, more than entering directs it. (58, 5-8) 
 It occurs to me that the word “orientation” has a particular relevance. The label of  the “Orient” already conflates space 7
and direction with designation (that is, “Chinese Space”).“Orient” means that Asia, at least in a Western cultural 
imagination, has a spaced quality, and space and direction have an Asian quality. What is the reason we don’t use “to 
occident?” 
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The eye is the subject (where the mode is the partial and relational, perspective is necessarily going 
to be central) and expecting to confront space instead experiences events. The first of  these modes of  
seeing is absolute and in “confront” presumes a total distinction between subject and object (that is, 
between self  or perspective, and space); the second is fluid and suggests a more dynamic 
relationship between subject and object. The pattern I described above of  the physical and 
conceptual perspective shifts is evident in the next lines. The “crickets in Ming jars,” which are 
already a feature of  the “optical events,” are momentarily the central object but are then figured in 
terms of  entrance into the house which becomes the object the sentence closes with as the speaker 
elaborates, “an experience that cannot be sustained…” This shift occurs subtly, is almost difficult to 
follow, because you come across the next element, the entrance into the house, before you realize 
you have left the crickets, the previous one, behind. What could’ve been a serial, linear description 
of  walking through and observing a house instead asserts a more complex, dynamic relationship 
between the self, space, and time that enacts the partiality and relationality of  experiencing those 
things. 
 I’d also add—and I don’t want to simplistically map things onto each other, but I think this 
addition is justified—that the way this grammar works totally corresponds to the  particular 
experience of  walking through a Chinese zen garden (and I imagine the architectural principles of  
zen gardens have influence or correspondence throughout Chinese architecture). Different elements 
of  the space come into focus as you progress through the garden, the design intentionally 
manufacturing moments of  clarity and stillness (like the moment the reader can pause with the 
crickets) and then disrupting them as you keep moving. These disruptions, these new elements, like 
the introduction of  the entrance into the house—“like the right, then left, then right”—take a 
moment to unfold and settle as you approach the intended perspective from which to view them, 
and then have their own moment of  clarity and stillness (when we connect “the right, then left…” 
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to the concept of  progressing into the house). This is the experience described in the quote I began 
this account with where approach transforms a vanishing point into a corner.  
 In the final stanza a different, western model of  space begins to bump up against this partial, 
unfolding Chinese model:  
 After the house was electrically wired in the thirties, he installed a ticker-tape machine 
connected 
 to the American stock exchange. Any existence occupies time, he would say in the Chinese 
version, 
 reading stock quotations and meaning the simplicity of  the courtyard into a lavish biosphere, 
 elevating the fact of  its placement to one of  our occupation of  it, including the macaw 
speaking Chinese, 
 stones representing infinity in the garden. This is how the world appears when the person 
 becomes sufficient (Berssenbrugge, 59, 27-32) 
The wiring and stock machine act as an insinuation of  a new system of  space, time, and 
interestingly, value, into the established system of  Chinese space. In this model, where the person is 
“sufficient,” they become the arbiter of  meaning in the space. It is not “the fact of  its placement” 
that means, but the human presence which perceives, imagines meaning onto, and materially impacts 
the space. The assertion that “Any existence occupies time” would seem to gel with the model of  
Chinese space where the self, space, and time are intimately constellated, but I think “occupy” is 
meant to take on a more total quality; not “to occupy” as in “to inhabit” but as in “to dominate.” 
The motion from “the fact of  its placement to one of  our occupation of  it” then takes on a 
dictatorial tint.  
 The macaw speaking Chinese would seem to corroborate the human occupation of  the 
space as total, representing not just an ability to materially influence material things but also an 
assertion of  symbolic human existence—language—influencing the material conditions. In this case, 
the western model seems to win out, if  only through force. This reading misses, however, that the 
macaw is not, in fact, speaking Chinese, but mimicking sounds that exist in its environment, just 
other elements of  “the fact of  its placement.” It is, instead, the human apprehension of  that 
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mimicking that transforms it into language—and transformation through apprehension is exactly the 
Chinese space model. Occupation is, so, defused.  
 If  the poem’s western model of  the self  in space is about being “sufficient,” perhaps the 
Chinese model holds the self  in space as necessary, but not sufficient or determining. There’s a 
freedom imparted by not needing to be sufficient, not needing to be the total matrix of  meaning. 
The taking of  pictures becomes a paradigm for this attitude. Berssenbrugge writes, “The 
grandmother poses beside rose bushes. / That is to say, a weary and perplexing quality of  the rough 
wall behind her gives a power of  tolerance / beyond the margins of  the photograph” (59, 20-2). 
There’s something reciprocal, or evenly distributed, in these lines that I think again comes from 
Berssenbrugge’s interesting ordering choices. The present tense “poses” makes it ambiguous 
whether this is a description of  a photograph being taken or of  a photograph that already exists; 
because there hasn’t yet been a mention of  the photograph itself  at that point in the line, the poem 
encourages one to read it in the lived present tense rather than the photographic present tense. The 
grandmother has meaning-making agency first in the posing; then the wall becomes the agent of  
meaning with the activity of  “give”. Interestingly, the description of  how the wall “gives a power of  
tolerance / beyond the margins of  the photograph” is the only signal that this photograph has 
already been taken. This fact, plus the context of  the poem, the wandering through a house that 
seems to be in some way a part of  the past, invites us only retroactively to think that the posing was 
actually in the photographic present tense. It would be easy to read the taking of  pictures as aligned 
with the western model in a kind of  assertion of  the perspective and limits of  a space; but since it is 
only in the description of  the agency of  the space that we loop back around and realize we’re 
looking at a photograph, the poem’s lyric seems to make the space contain the photograph more 
than the reverse. The photograph is, of  course, a human axis of  meaning but something about, 
perhaps, its specificity, how it can render a trait as particular and inhabited of  a space as “a weary 
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and perplexing quality of  the rough wall,” that then has influence outside the limits of  the 
photograph, means it doesn’t abolish, and may even be subject to, the agency of  the space.  
 The second instance of  picture taking centers on human apprehension specifically, 
solidifying the poem’s understanding of  its relationship to context (space, time, other people). 
Berssenbrugge writes, “The family poses in front of  the hotel, both self-knowing and knowing 
others at the same time. / This is so, because human memory as a part of  unfinished nature is 
provided / for the experience of  your unfinished existence” (59, 35-7). In the first sentence posing 
is again related to a mutual relationship between the self  and context. In the moment of  pause and 
composition there’s an impulse present, in the case of  both the grandmother and rose bush and 
wall, and the family, to also talk about the reciprocal motions of  their existence; that is, the quality 
of  the wall being the vehicle of  the photograph, and the self-knowing and knowing. “This is so,” I 
think because the moment of  composition, the photograph, is a moment of  finishing, a moment of  
finished existence, but, as the speaker says, human memory is not. The photograph is nested in 
reciprocity between the self  and existence because everything that surrounds it as a finished moment
—the people posing, the person taking it, the person viewing it—are living in unfinished nature. To 
finish or to be absolute or to occupy would be a kind of  death or “finished nature.” “Unfinished 
nature” makes me think of  the macaw, who would start speaking Italian or Swahili if  those sounds 
became a part of  its environment. Humans in the same way are always unfolding, in Chinese space 
or elsewhere. To be alive, to be part of  nature, is to be unfinished and shifting.  
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Incidental Poem Number Four: “What We Mean” by Rae Armantrout  
Generation Sequence: 
page 441, “First Draw the Sea” by Keith Waldrop, skipped under rule iii. 
page 19  
 I can’t tell you how glad I am to leave Keith Waldrop’s “First Draw the Sea” in the literary 
dust. I know the premise of  this project would absolutely prime me to think this at the first male 
poet I come to but—genuinely—this poem is ACHINGLY masculine. I’m trading the rhetorical 
existential questions, Latin phrases, Christian imagery, and self-congratulating mention of  Sappho 
for Rae Armantrout’s self  described “Cheshire poetics,” “poems that seemed as if  they were either 
going to vanish or explode - … extremes, in other words, radical poetries” (Armantrout, EPC) with 
pleasure.  
 Armantrout’s statement of  poetics has an affinity with some of  the implicit premises and 
concerns of  this project. Perhaps the reverse is more accurate, that this project has an affinity with 
Armantrout’s statement—and not through accident but indeed through incident—as the poetic 
school she belongs to, the Language poets, have had their fair say in my poetic training. She writes 
that the “radical” in radical poetries might be measured “by how much is put at risk in the text, how 
far the arc of  implication can reach and still seem apt” (Armantrout, EPC). The premise of  this 
project—that breaking a poetic prescriptiveness through randomness and incident could have 
implications for political prescriptiveness—presupposes a far-reaching arc. “Political” isn’t quite a 
sufficient descriptor, though. I’ll let feminist Shulamith Firestone speak for me: that the scope of  
implication “cannot be easily fit into traditional categories of  thought, e.g., ‘political,’ is not because 
these categories do not apply but because they are not big enough: radical feminism bursts through 
them. If  there were another word more all-embracing than revolution we would use it” (1). Both the 
model of  radical feminism that informs the criticality about patterned thinking in this project and 
Armantrout’s radical Cheshire poetics seek to reconstitute things (or understandings of  things)—
ideas, language, culture, institutions—to a degree that exposes an extreme kind of  truth. It loops 
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around, too, back from radical feminism to language and poetry, given assertions like Firestone’s 
later one that the conceptual category of  the Other—yes, Beauvoir’s Other—(which forms the basis 
of  fundamental units of  language like “you,” “I,” etc.) is premised on the sex division (Firestone, 7). 
A Cheshire poetics doesn’t presume congruency and finds conceptual pull in either its lack or its 
incidental occurrence. Similarly, radical feminism’s “bursting” quality means one can find resonances 
in unpresumed places (incongruent places) and in the same way it can gain resonance from those 
places.  
 Armantrout’s “What We Mean” is concerned with definition—of  language, of  states of  
being. She writes in her Cheshire poetics statement that “I think of  my poetry as inherently political. 
(though it is not a poetry of  opinion). In an optimistic mood, one might see the multiple, optional 
relations of  [formally disjunctive] parts in such work as a kind of  anarchic 
cooperation” (Armantrout, EPC). Indeed, the poem, split into three subsections, has about 15 
disjunctive elements floating around. In this case, though, the form of  “anarchic cooperation” 
described, the way disparate things might come together or diffuse even more, is part of  the 
question of  the poem. More precisely put, the way context could settle those elements into meaning is being 
investigated. The political arc of  implication for the poem, if  we’re thinking Cheshire poetics, stakes 
language and context as determiners of  reality; I use “stakes,” though, because of  the poem’s 
unsettledness—asserting these things would be a settling context and that’s not this poem or 
Armantrout’s mode. She writes that her poetry “points two ways then vanishes in the blur of  what is 
seen and what is seeing” (EPC). I’m trying to render the blur.  
 About halfway through the poem the speaker says, “A peculiar / reluctance to ask / 
presented by whom / and in what space?” (Armantrout, American Hybrid, 19, 16-9). This moment is 
in some ways meant to prompt the reader to ask these questions of  the poem itself  given that the 
answers are conspicuously absent. “Presented by whom?” “We” is the narrating voice of  the poem 
and is of  totally ambiguous character. It could be a royal “we,” especially given the poem’s opening 
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address, “Oh Princess,” (Armantrout, AH, 18, 1). It could also be a statement of  a particular group, 
perhaps poets, or a sort of  universalizing “we” of  modern humanity which would implicate the 
reader into its ranks. It could also be a conspiratorial “we,” implicating just the reader in with the 
speaker. Of  course, making a call about the correct character of  the “we” would be impossible and 
unfounded; the relevant information is the effect it has on the experience of  the poem, which is the 
effect of  an authoritative and collectivizing voice claiming consensus among totally unknown agents. 
The assertions based on the consensus of  this group can still be made, and they are—“By space we 
mean / the collapsible / whirligig / of  attention” (Armantrout, AH, 19, 20-3)—but the context that 
is implicitly originating them and that should inform ambiguities in their stated positions is missing.  
 The second question, “presented … in what space?” yields similar answers. The definition 
of  “space” quoted above is preceded by this question and so the moment of  reading it doesn’t yet 
entail that definition. If  we allow it to be asking about physical space, the most physically grounded 
moment of  the poem is its beginning, “Oh Princess, / you apple-core afloat / in coke / in a 
Styrofoam cup, / on an end-table, / you dust, glass, book, crock, thorn, moon. / Oh Beauty who fell 
asleep / on your birthday / we swipe at you” (Armantrout, AH, 18, 1-9). Despite this being the 
most material time in the poem it’s not material in any cohesive way; it’s not a scene or something to 
lend stability to the rest of  the conceptual reflections of  the poem. It’s dislocated just like the 
identity of  the “we,” in both the lack of  material context and the form; “Oh Princess,” who then 
becomes an apple core, also in a coke, is, too, in a cup, etc. We trip over each new addition for those 
first five lines because we keep expecting the characterization to end before it does, and then are 
propelled in frenzy through the further mutations, “dust, glass, book…” It’s totally unclear at this 
point if  what’s being described is living or object, human or concept. What space are we in then? 
This immaterial material passage is immediately followed up by the question: “How are we defining 
‘dream’?” (Armantrout, AH, 18, 10).  
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 The question posed by the poem—“by whom and in what space?”—applied to the phrase 
“What We Mean” asks who and what determines the space of  meaning. The space of  meaning 
could be definition—“What We Mean” when we say “X”—but does that mean that things without 
definition, lacking determinable limits, like dreams (“How are we defining ‘dream’?”), sleep (“Oh 
Beauty who fell asleep”), death (“(obits)” (Armantrout, AH, 19, 28)), and space, as in outer, 
(“among orbits” (Armantrout, AH, 19, 27)), don’t have meaning? Definition happens in the present 
tense grammatically in the poem (“defining dream”) and conceptually. It’s a kind of  consensus we 
can experience or invoke in the present as a stand-in for things that may not exist in the present. 
Dreams, death, and space are kinds of  presents that don’t function on consensus because they’re 
vast enough and immersive enough to set their own terms. After asking about dream definition, 
Armantrout writes “An exaggerated sense / of  the relevance / of  these details, / of  ‘facts’ / as 
presented?” (AH, 18, 11-5). Taken as answer to the question of  dream definition (I don’t think it has 
to be—“the multiple, optional relations of  [formally disjunctive] parts”), I think what’s being 
described is the raised stakes of  dreams, the way our priorities in dreams hinge on things that upon 
reflection are total extremities in the sense of  exaggerated relevance, as she puts it, or the reverse 
where unreasonable, scary, big things are just the “‘facts’ / as presented.” The “reluctance to ask / 
presented by whom / and in what space?” also describes the way we don’t question the altered 
reality when we’re in it; we show up in the middle of  the action so things that seem disproportionate 
can just be, they don’t require a scaling narrative to bring them to that point. That is, they don’t need 
a context to settle them.  
 This state is different from the state of  the unsettled poem where we ask “who constitutes 
we?” and what does that mean for what “we” profess to believe? The poem is finite and will be read 
in context;  the reader can choose to accept the invitation of  the unsettled poem to take the facts as 8
 I, for example, am lying in bed. I just had an apple cider donut and some oat milk while reading an article in the 8
Atlantic. Today I didn’t turn my phone on and I’ve been thinking about how nice today has been without it. Sometimes 
one can have too much context. 
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presented, but probably they won’t. It is likely instead that they will undertake “the collapsible / 
whirligig / of  attention, / the figuring and / reconfiguring / of  charges / among orbits / … that 
has taken forever” (Armantrout, AH, 19, 22-9). What we mean is premised on what we choose to 
attend to and how we arrange the things we do (presented by us!!! And in this space!!!). The clipped 
sentences of  this particular Cheshire poem give the sense of  words as moveable blocks or units 
subject to human selection. Context is a short-hand kind of  settling and most of  the time it does the 
job; I can tell you to hand me the pomegranate on the counter and a knife from the drawer and you 
will probably choose a serrated knife over a butter knife. But there would be meaning in taking a 
butter knife and stabbing it into a pomegranate and letting the juice fly and vanishing in the blur.  
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Incidental Poem Number Five: excerpt from Don’t Let Me Be Lonely by Claudia Rankine 
Generation Sequence: 
page 338 
 Claudia Rankine, my love, thank you for meeting me here.  I first read Don’t Let Me Be Lonely 9
(DLMBL) at the end of  a very beloved poetry class. Winter became spring and we read O’Hara and 
Dickinson and Bashō and Lorca and then we read Rankine and we talked about her in an ugly room 
in a beautiful mansion on a hill. I didn’t like her at first; prose poetry isn’t my favorite and the poem 
made me sad at a time when I was sick of  ugly (in the sense of  hurtful) art.  She’s been sitting in me 10
for a long time, though, and the earnest, ironic, vulnerable, broken mood of  the poem has been 
acting within me like one of  the dominating metaphors of  the poem, the “giant liver, [that] receives 
everyone and everything” (Rankine, 341, 67) acts on its objects. It separates the gold out from the 
silt.  
 As I’ve been doing with excerpted or fragmented poems, I’ll lightly be taking the Norton’s 
sequencing as premise. It’s worth noting, though, that unlike the Norton’s formatting of  A Palace of  
Pearls which signaled absence through numbering the excerpts (it went from 1 to 2 to 4 to 22) the 
Norton’s formatting of  DLMBL doesn’t distinguish between page breaks (of  which there are many 
in the original formatting) and absence. That is, the same little black square marks where there’s a 
new page and where there’s a new page having skipped several pages. This formatting choice also 
means that unlike in the original where most pages (and it’s a notably tall book. Normal paperback 
width but extra long) only have truly a fraction of  the page occupied by writing, the total length of  
each of  the Norton pages is occupied. I’m sure it’s a different poem for these reasons—the sense of  
 “Emily Dickinson, my love, / hope was never a thing with feathers” (Rankine, 340, 19-20).9
 I also read the whole thing straight through in one of  the oddest sensory and psychic states I’ve experienced which 10
was while temporarily working as a gallery monitor at the Hessel Museum of  Art. My job was to stand in one room of  
the gallery for maybe four hours. The particular room I was assigned had a looping audio and video display (other 
connected and echoing rooms did, too) that I must have heard and watched 100 times. This made the stakes of  the 
reading experience—the original book version of  the poem features images of  staticky TV screens—feel quite 
immediate. 
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void and emptiness the gaping white pages emit is definitely moderated—but that’s part of  the 
experience of  anthology, the concessions that attend being one of  many.  
 The one and the many, the part and the whole, is a thematic concern of  DLMBL  (and 11
Rankine’s other work. See: Citizen). The Norton’s biography on her asserts that “she searches for 
both the root and the ramifications of  social discord in the specific choices and responses of  
individual people” (AH, 337), an analysis that speaks to her complex handling of  the part-whole 
relationship. Harmful cultural dynamics do not originate from individuals but they take residence in 
and gain strength from them; whether or not the whole is greater than the sum of  its parts, the parts 
still matter to the character of  the whole. This analysis of  the role of  the individual dominates 
Citizen, where interpersonal racial micro aggressions (and straight up aggressions) constitute the 
black speaker’s lived experience of  racism. The inverse direction is true for Rankine, too—and 
DLMBL takes this element as its greater focus—where individual pain is not separable from 
collective pain. She writes, “I forget things too. It makes me sad. Or it makes the me the saddest. / 
… the sadness lives in / the recognition that a life can not matter” (340, 14-5). This phrasing, “a life 
can not matter,” read grammatically suggests that mattering is the default but that that default can be 
interrupted: it’s possible for a life to not matter. It’s an intentionally awkward phrasing, though, and 
read aloud or phonetically one also hears “a life cannot matter.” This ambiguity (or doubleness—the 
two readings conflict) suggests that when a single life can be displaced from mattering, life 
categorically cannot matter. This effect is resonant with the Emma Lazarus quote, “Until we are all 
free, we are none of  us free” (Jewish Women’s Archive) (also associated with Maya Angelou; also 
central to black feminism) and evokes for me the radical feminist anti-prostitution argument that 
when any women is a commodity, all are. In this model the suffering of  the individual belonging to a 
 Armantrout says the same thing of  her poetry, writing that it speaks to questions like “Does the part represent the 11
whole? Is metaphor fair to the matter it represents? Does representative democracy work?” (Armantrout, EPC). Rankine 
is certainly in a similar sphere, if  at a different angle. 
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group is necessarily consequential to that group because it admits the potential suffering of  the rest 
of  the group.  
 I think this model of  suffering scares people sometimes because it suggests a homogeneity 
to the conditions of  a particular group, and perhaps accordingly an interchangeability among them, 
as if  a general material analysis of  the conditions of  a particular class negates the personhood or 
identities of  the people belonging to that class. The quote above, “It makes me sad. Or it makes me 
the saddest,” captures a similar arc of  anxiety about relating one’s own position to the position of  
the group. The speaker loses a sense of  the character of  her own emotions because she seeks to 
calibrate them against an absolute scale. “Saddest” doesn’t necessarily read as “saddest of  the 
group,” whatever that group may be—I actually think it’s meant to be an internal, personal scale—
but it’s still symptomatic of  a desire to measure pain in determinate, proportionate ways. The 
question of  interchangeability I raised above is another facet of  Rankine’s exploration concerning 
the standardized measuring of  pain and of  the self. The speaker says that when her father dies and 
she can’t attend the funeral she wants to send a replacement mourner. She conjures this 
“replacement mourner, a woman. She has lost her / mother years before and because she is already 
grieving she just continues / attending funerals for a price. Like a wet nurse, the prerequisite is a 
state of  / ‘already grief ’” (Rankine, 341, 50-3). There’s an absurdity to this premise, first produced 
by the idea that it is the speaker’s act of  mourning, and not her particular person and its mourning 
that has value, and second, by the attempt toward authenticity implied by the requirement that the 
replacement mourner genuinely be grieving. It’s still a kind of  authenticity but, again, it doesn’t value 
particularity; it seems to see pain as a collective, undiscerning resource that’s not performative and 
yet somehow doesn’t need sincere correspondence to its object (as performativity doesn’t). It’s an 
absurd concept, yes, but it’s also earnest, another way of  trying to relate the suffering of  one person 
to the suffering of  others.  
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 Trying to understand relational suffering was one of  the concerns of  this project in an 
earlier iteration; I was thinking a lot about how we should conceptualize different classes of  violence 
(rape versus verbal sexual harassment, for example) and violence against victims of  different societal 
and cultural status’ (a working class woman who needs her job for survival coerced into sex with her 
boss versus a millionaire movie star who has resources and support in place coerced into sex with 
hers) in terms of  each other. All rape is unacceptable and horrific and the pain it causes shouldn’t be 
ranked but how then do we account for the disparity between the immediately consequential 
material implications involved in these two theoretical women’s rapes? Similarly, how do we 
categorically condemn all invocations of  misogyny (rape versus verbal harassment) while taking into 
account the varying degrees of  suffering they cause?  
 Rankine implicitly is asking, and perhaps answering, these same questions in the integrating 
and repetitive way she weaves different elements, different instances of  suffering, into her particular, 
polyphonic writing. The blending of  voices and experiences of  suffering separates it from strict 
residence in the individual and individual instance, or more specifically it figures specific and 
individual instances in terms of  others. Rankine writes about Bush winning the presidency,  “the 12
same Bush who can’t remember if  two or three people were convicted for dragging a black man to 
death in his home state of  Texas. You don’t remember because you don’t care. Sometimes my mother’s 
voice swells and fills my forehead” (338); this then moves into the line, “I forget things too. It makes 
me sad. Or it makes me the saddest” (340). This isn’t the neatest example of  this formal trait, but it 
expresses the slippery quality Rankine’s portrayal of  pain has, where one response or expression of  
it—the mother’s admonition—can become an element of  other pain, whether it’s a different 
person’s or different instance of. A particular cadence she often uses plays into the slippery quality, 
too: “The words remain an inscription on the surface of  my loneliness. This loneliness stems from a 
 She writes, “Cornel West makes the point that hope is different from American optimism. After the initial presidential 12
election results come in, I stop watching the news” (338). When I first read this (I didn’t know when it was published) I 
assumed this was the 2016 election—it is, I’d argue, which is another instance of  reverberating sufferings. 
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feeling of  uselessness” (Rankine, 341). Concepts blur into each other, or become features of  each 
other. Experiences of  suffering and their particular, located or expressed qualities for Rankine act as 
the language for other located experiences of  suffering.   13
 All these attempts at understanding the modes of  relation between the part and the whole as 
they relate to pain speak to the fundamental imperative of  the book; that is, “don’t let me be lonely!” 
What models of  relation can mitigate 
others’ pain? is one of  the implicit 
questions of  the imperative. The poem 
and the Norton excerpts end with one 
answer, worth representing in full here.  14
  There’s something difficult to 
hook into about the final passage, a 
quality produced by its circularity. The 
repetition and the insistent presence of  
the “Here,” forces each line to be 
coextensive with the rest at the same time 
as Rankine complexly accounts for their 
coextensivity. “Here” takes on a 
polyvalent quality constituted by 
meanings that feel like they immediately 
 The language I came to for understanding violence of  differing conditions was scales of  violence, which I think 13
captures the way different expressions of  oppressive systems, racial micro aggressions versus racialized police brutality, 
for instance, or the theoretical instances of  misogynistic violence described above, are just dilations of  each other, the 
same substance in different concentrations. This links rather than divides the experiences of  suffering that may take place 
in different degrees while also accounting for the consequences of  that variation. This is essentially just an expression of  
the personal being political, where all individual experiences of  classed pain are symptomatic of  it, as well as the analysis 
of  Rankine about roots and ramifications in individuals, but I think the conceptual apparatus of  scaling is helpful. 
 Here.14
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converge the second you try to isolate them—is “being Here” really different from “Here you are?” 
“I am here. It also means to hand something to somebody—Here you are” (Rankine, 342); there’s a 
distinction being made with the “also” but the language itself  does not corroborate that: “I am here” 
and “Here you are” feel like they signify the same thing. The status of  Here becomes immediate and 
prelapsarian in the attempts at isolation that cannot help but give way to convergence.  Each angle 15
Here is approached from channels to the same point which is the word on the page, its meaning, 
your field of  vision, the fact of  the poem—which is a handshake which is its Hereness. Being Here 
is an assertion of  solidity and a premise of  solidarity: don’t let me be lonely.  16
 As immediate as presence is in these lines, it’s also paired with relinquishment, a kind of  
absence: “The handshake is our decided ritual of  both asserting (I am here) and handing over (here) 
a self  to another” (Rankine, 342). There’s a loss in this that needs accounting for. The mention of  
the translation of  the Celan quote signals this sense of  relinquishment; she writes, “Or Paul Celan 
said that the poem was no different from a handshake. I cannot see a basic difference between a handshake 
and a poem—is how Rosmarie Waldrop translated his German” (342). This first expression of  the 
poem as handshake and Hereness also enacts its meaning in the way that translation is a kind of  
handshake: the assertion and handing over. The placement of  the framing context—“is how 
Rosmarie…”—after the translation, which allows the original and translation to touch syntactically, 
curates this. This enactment is also a convergence of  sign and signified; as the relinquishment 
entailed by the handshake is being described, the relinquishment inherent to translation is 
represented.  
 Translation is a relinquishment or loss through the sacrifice of  precise, individual, authorial 
meaning in the name of  dissemination, or in the name of  being one of  many (languages, peoples, etc.). 
The loss is, then, constructive in both the sense of  reception and in the act of  translation itself. The 
 And the image of  the billboard becomes both a reclaimed and corrupted Garden.15
 This is resonant, perhaps, with the contemporary imperative in activism to “show up.”16
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translator may cut things or augment them to retain their meaning but through this process builds 
upon the original text. A good translator’s constructiveness is in the interesting or evocative ways 
they represent, but a bad translator does constructive work too even if  only in the meaning produced 
by its failures up against the original text. It’s not a question of  value but a question of  being: a bad 
handshake is still a handshake, still has reverberations, is still Here. The loss in translation, 
handshake, poem, is an additive loss; even looking at the slight variation between Celan’s phrasing, 
“the poem was no different from a handshake”  and Waldrop’s “I cannot see any basic difference 17
between…” an interesting relationship is produced between binaries as designation (not different/
different) and foundations or essentials as designation (no “basic difference”). This raises questions 
about whether we can still meaningfully classify groups that have variance; what the threshold of  a 
classifying system becoming spectral (in the sense of  a spectrum) is; what the relationship between 
cultural or linguistic shorthands and technical meaning is; etc. I digress, because this is not the point; 
or the point is the fact of  my digression which would not exist if  not for a minute variation in 
translation. A cloistering anti-translation, anti-handshake purity that fears loss through 
relinquishment ends up, in fact, having lost, being lesser, for the constructiveness it precludes. 
 So, perhaps being Here is about constructive loss, and perhaps constructive loss is the mood 
of  those ambivalent final words, “presence of ” (Rankine, 342). The hanging preposition gives way 
to an absence—the loss of  an infinite number of  words it could’ve been—but it’s also a resistance 
to definition which is perhaps a kind of  presence in the sense of  an escape from ego. And, indeed, it 
is a presence—it’s the ending of  a handshake, a poem, and a return to an embodied experience of  
self. Not in the poem—the poem is over—but Here. Having just read a poem.  
 I realize this is Rankine’s paraphrasing but the use of  “no” is what will become salient shortly and that seems to be 17
technically true to the original. 
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Synthetic 
 Here. Having just read a poem, or having just read five. When Langston Hughes wrote, “She 
/ Who searched for lovers / In the night,” he conjured, as I wrote at the time of  that poem, a 
woman not Here, symbolized by proxy. The woman not Here or the Othered woman is a negative 
presence, constituted only by her patriarchally-determined actions and status and by her 
objectification at the hands, or eyes and minds, of  herself  and of  men. She has a subjectivity but 
Hughes’ rendering speaks to how a self-objectification forced by the social conditioning of  
womanhood turns her subjectivity into an empty space and displaces the location of  her selfhood 
from her internal experiencing to her functional place in the world.  As a radical feminist, I believe 18
that women have responsibilities to themselves and to other woman to mechanically de-objectify 
themselves as much as they can; this is a moral imperative, I believe, for the elements of  
womanhood that respond to will. But these acts of  de-objectification are not synonymous with the 
reinstating of  a non-objectifying subjectivity because of  the confounding effects of  the insidious 
elements of  womanhood this project met impasse within.  
 Looking back to Adnan’s poem helps us to think through the insufficiency of  mechanical 
de-objectification for full reclamation of  subjectivity. As woman’s self  is cut off  from her actions  
through the programmatic quality of  patriarchy, we see the missing subject of  the poem alienated 
from her actions through the programmatic quality of  war. Feminist historian Maria Mies tells us 
that war is a masculine mode associated with, or having its roots in, the particular object relation to 
nature that men developed in early human history. While women could conceive of  their total body 
as productive through childbirth and so saw production as an integrated mode of  being, men had to 
 Radical feminist Ti-Grace Atkinson writes that understanding the patriarchal classing and thus objectifying (and thus 18
self-objectifying) of  women requires understanding that “‘political’ classes are artificial; they define persons with certain 
capacities by that capacity, changing the contingent to the necessary, thereby appropriating the capacity of  an individual 
as a function of  society” (Radical Feminism). This has a number of  implications such as the abolition of  gender which 
reifies the sex division; for our purposes, though it’s interesting framing the caste of  womanhood as function up against 
selfhood as a kind of  capacity. If  we think of  capacity in an allowing way, like the poetic capacity, perhaps we get 
somewhere…
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act on nature to be productive and did so through the mediation of  tools. This mode of  acting on 
through tools paved the way for the development of  weaponry and war; more importantly for trying 
to understand the insufficiency of  de-objectification through will, it planted the conceptual seeds in 
the male psyche that would grow into interaction between subject and object figured as an 
oppositional and predatory relationship where subject acts upon object. This logic of  the subject, 
where to be fully subject is to be constituted by one’s actions upon an object, is hence a patriarchal 
and male model. In attempts to undo self-objectification, the premise that doing anti-patriarchal 
actions, or acting on the objectified subject in a feminist mode, is a way to build a comprehensive 
anti-patriarchal self, thus relies on a smuggled in patriarchal logic. The effect of  this is a failure to 
account for the fact that these actions exist on the level of  politics, and as Firestone tells us, radical 
feminism at its best has a bursting quality that is excessive of  politics, that isn’t bound by patriarchal 
categorizations of  the elements of  culture. Thus, to get outside the bounds of  patriarchy, the 
process of  subjectification must also have a bursting, excessive quality.  19
 This excessive self, constituted not solely by her actions, anti-feminist or anti-patriarchal, but 
by the fact of  her whole, excessive subjectivity is, up against Hughes’ woman not Here, the woman 
Here. This isn’t actually a new insight within this project; we’ve known that a woman has total 
subjectivity even in her self-objectification by being aware and analytic about that self-objectification. 
The quality of  the Hereness produced by that dynamic is exactly the suspension between feminism 
and patriarchy that became both the functional and conceptual stake of  this project. But it was that 
impasse of  suspension where I began to center methodology—turned to the mode of  incidental 
poetics—and anti-prescriptively invited the five poets to join me Here. (“Claudia Rankine, and Jane 
and Mei-Mei and Etel and Rae, my loves, thank you for meeting me here”). And I invited them not 
 That being said, the political mode one lives in has an influence on one’s subjectivity that isn’t negligible. The excessive 19
self  absolutely responds to political action but just is not fully constituted by it. Additionally, as can’t be said enough in 
the current feminist climate, the anti-patriarchal actions of  individual women can have a positive rippling effect—
especially when they occur on a large scale and thus become collective—which is why feminist culture needs to promote 
actively anti-patriarchal individual action and expression instead of  homogenizing it all as male fantasies. 
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through any theoretical agenda that might attempt to conjure subjectivity—theirs, mine, 
paradigmatic woman’s—through a particular mode of  feminist action or thought, thus invoking 
male predatory object relation, but instead they joined me through randomness and incident. This 
random selection was a practice of  Hereness in that it involved relinquishing some of  my agency 
(the agency to choose what I attend to) in exchange for the poets’ relinquishing of  their poems to 
my criticism; that is, the random selection was a practice of  constructive loss. In short, I have read 
poetry. Or, in short, we have shaken hands. This is a way of  doing classed womanhood as a form of  
relationality which is an operation I will elaborate on. First I want to investigate the specific 
Hereness the six of  us have produced, or what the fact of  a collective specific Hereness means.  
 As the varying, complex, intricate, not intricate, writings of  these five women evidence, they 
are quite literally possessive of  subjectivities adept and agential. Beauvoir’s description of  women’s 
drama indeed accounted for the truth of  complex female subjectivity while also pointing to the self-
objectifying impulse of  that subjectivity; the self-objectifying impulse is a cultural reality we find still 
explicit and implicit in and among the expressive (and excessive) subjectivities of  these poems. In 
DLMBL, Rankine writes, “Mahalia Jackson is a genius. Or Mahalia Jackson has genius. The man I 
am with is trying to make a distinction” (340). This moment renders both ex- and implicitly the 
impact of  women’s Othering within the culture and within themselves. In the speaker’s male 
partner’s distinction between being and having, he conceptually denies the possibility of  Jackson being 
any kind of  holistic self, particularly a positively and male coded form of  self  (a genius). Instead, she 
is only allowed attributive genius the same way a pretty photograph might have a blue sky but is not 
one, does not get to claim the sky’s subject position. Similarly, shifting from being to having denies 
for Jackson the claim to the subject position of  her own genius. This is misogyny proper (and racism 
and classism, as the speaker says in the next line) and it suggests internalized misogyny, or self-
Othering in the way Rankine’s speaker is the voice of  the distinction (not “The man I am with says 
Mahalia Jackson has genius,” but, “Mahalia Jackson has genius”). She asserts from her own subject 
 40
position and then clarifies that this distinction is not native to her but a translation of  her partner’s 
analysis. Also, she never reinserts him into the subject position of  the assertion; he is only described 
as making the distinction. Although the follow-up critical reflections on the oppressive trappings of  
the distinction impart a certain exasperated and critical quality to the tone of  the original statements, 
the overpowering and pervading nature of  the male subject position is still rendered. This is not 
particularly something that needed proving, but here we affirm the presence of  prescribed female 
subjectivity in these particular poets and poems.  
 When Beauvoir says, “along with the ethical urge of  each individual to affirm his subjective 
existence, there is also the temptation to forgo liberty and become a thing”  (30) we know this to be 20
true and see it in the Rankine above and everywhere we look, including inside ourselves. The woman 
as self-objectifying Other is a fantastic, synthetic, useful theoretical account for women seeking to 
understand patriarchy and themselves under patriarchy. It is an account concerned with 
apprehending and rendering the stringencies of  phallic objectifying culture—but phallic objectifying 
culture is harmful precisely because it doesn’t allow for the subjectivity of  women. Thus, descriptive 
accounts of  the culture don’t particularly allow for women’s subjectivity either in mechanical or 
representative ways, although they indicate the fact of  it.  Thus we see that a theoretical account of  21
women’s self-Othering is absolutely true, but it also replicates totalizing and prescriptive cultural 
patterns by way of  being concerned with culture as such. Our representations of  varying, complex, 
intricate, not intricate, female subjectivities in these five poems, then, although they are products of  
political and prescribed female subjectivity, are not sufficiently accounted for by the theory that 
surrounds and gives language to that cultural positioning. To allow them to be would be to concede 
a patriarchal victory.  
 Read “her subjective existence;” Simone, darling, practice what you preach.20
 That is, women’s subjectivity is a premise of  feminist theory, not the content it centers. 21
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 Luce Irigaray describes the motion toward a similar kind of  possible patriarchal victory and 
the flawed logic that makes it contestable. We can use this logic transferably: 
Commodities among themselves are thus not equal, not alike, nor different. They only 
becomes so when they are compared by and for man. And the prosopopoeia of  the relation of  
commodities among themselves is a projection through which producers-exchangers make them 
reenact before their eyes their operations of  specula(riza)tion. Forgetting that in order to 
reflect (oneself), to speculate (oneself), it is necessary to be a ‘subject,’ and that matter can 
serve as a support for speculation but cannot itself  speculate in any way” (Irigaray, 177). 
In our case, we will take this “prosopopoeia of  commodities among themselves” to extend to the way 
patriarchy ends up mechanically speaking through feminist theory and recreating the “operations of  
specula(riza)tion,” or self-objectification. The logic flaw Irigaray points to in the second half, the 
“forgetting,” highlights how both the culture and the woman who has been prescribed by the culture 
(and, for our purposes, the feminist theorist mapping the culture) do not account for the “self ” part 
of  “self-objectification.” This self  is materially as complex as any self  who does not self-objectify 
because the sovereignty of  self-objectification is not that vast—woman is not just the speculated 
“matter” she has been taught to make herself  into. This lack, I want to say, is not a failure of  
feminist theory but a cruelty of  patriarchy and evidence of  its insidiousness. What is accounted for 
by “remembering” the speculating self  is exactly the excessive model of  the self  I have already 
spoken about, where political prescription cannot, as hard as it may try, override the fact of  female 
subjectivity.  
 What happens when we center the fact of  female subjectivity and not its self-objectifying 
trait? Just as the social medicine of  political action is a kind of  leading by example, a pedagogic 
representation of  the possibilities of  action-based models of  feminist womanhood, each of  the 
poems I have written on is a pedagogic practice of  female subjectivity (and my criticism aimed to be 
too). Take the case of  the female body as sexual object specifically. The sexual Othering of  women is 
a classic element of  phallic culture that has a litany of  implications for how women experience sex. 
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Straight male sexuality is the desiring of  women, but straight female sexuality  is the desiring of  22
men desiring them. The desiring straight woman under patriarchy lusts not for the male body but for 
her desirable reflection in male eyes. This is symptomatic of  the same sexual subjectification of  man 
and objectification of  woman that centers the male orgasm in straight sex—the male orgasm is a 
representation of  male desire which is culturally the object of  female desire and so becomes 
synonymous with sexual desire totally (hence, phallic culture). This is the symbolic dimension of  
straight sex under patriarchy and feminist theory, as I have just exercised, excellently accounts for it. 
But when Jane Miller provides her purposefully obscuring description of  sex, “the surface of  my 
body is excited / like sharp stabs of  emotion in love,” she describes an embodied, complex—and 
through the excessive use of  metaphor that I traced in my original reading of  the poem—
obfuscating, un-pinnable, and, thus, un-objectifiable experience of  sex. That is, it is a representation 
of  an excessively subjective experience. The excessive subjective experience does not categorically, nor in 
this particular case, deny the purchase of  patriarchy; the phrasing of  “sharp stabs” again speaks to 
the predatory, mediated male object relation that has found its way from the dawn of  history 
through to contemporary sexual culture. The excessive subjective experience does, however, center 
the fact of  female subjectivity, which is decidedly subject and decidedly nebulous around and about 
and among its prescribed codings.  
 This series of  female poets representing their excessive subjectivities thus, on the one hand, 
provides a pedagogic model of  possibility for conceptualizing female subjectivity in all its true, lush 
complexity, reactant to and never unaffected by its self-objectification, but not coextensive with it. 
The second function is the production, through my critical engagement with the poems, of  one 
example, or a series of  examples, of  the possibility of  constructing women as an anti-patriarchal 
class by doing womanhood as a form of  relation. This is what I have described above as the 
 All women are touched by their cultural sexual Othering but it has differing effects along the axis of  sexual 22
orientation.
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project’s practice of  Hereness. That is, we—Isabel, Jane, Etel, Mei-Mei, Rae, and Claudia (as well as 
Simone, Gayle, Luce, Shulamith, and the rest)—are all women Here. In the model of  “Chinese 
Space” the self  unfolds and shifts and has moments of  stabilizing clarity and realization in 
proportion to the context it engages with. This is the latitude that is man’s cultural birthright—to 
react proportionally and directly to context without needing to account for the self  as context. But 
when the context we react to is other women experiencing their excessive selves—including their 
practices of  culturally conditioned womanhood but not reducible to those practices—the subject 
woman (that is, the woman reacting to them—you, me, etc.) begins to rely or depend on or account 
for those other women as total subjects. This account itself  is a challenge to self-objectification and 
the closest we have come to reclamation of  subjectivity. 
 The female subject reacting to other female subjects’ excessive subjectivities are the grounds 
of  Hereness of  this project, and constructive relinquishment is thus the mode. The poets 
relinquished their poems to my criticism; I relinquished my attention to their subjectivity. As over 
the last 40 pages they and you and I have all met Here, I have relinquished my criticism to you and I 
have implicitly asked you to relinquish your attention to me. This practice between women is a mode 
of  classing—and you must class to understand and escape class—that provides an extra-political exit 
route from prescribed womanhood. Or, more constructively put, an access route to figuring out 
what it means to be the subject. Rankine writes that, “The conflation of  the solidity of  presence 
with the offering of  this same presence perhaps has everything to do with being alive” (342)  
Irigaray writes “So commodities speak. To be sure, mostly dialects and patois, languages hard for ‘subjects’ to 
understand. The important thing is that they be preoccupied with their respective [exchange] values, 
that their remarks confirm the exchangers plans for them” (179). When women speak in these 
languages belonging to the self-objectifying subject (that is, woman, as opposed to Irigaray’s quote 
“‘subject” subject, or man), but refuse to “be preoccupied with [and] confirm the exchangers plans 
for them” by virtue of  their necessarily exceeding their exchange value (their prescribed 
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womanhood), they are offering their solidity and their subjectivity to other women, which has 
everything to do with being alive.  
★ 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“The female’s individuality … frightens and upsets [man] and fills him with envy. So he denies it in 
her … and tries to convince himself  and women (he’s succeeded best at convincing women) that the 
female function is … such as to make her interchangeable with every other female. In actual fact, the 
female function is to relate, groove, love, and be herself, irreplaceable by anyone else; the male 
function is to produce sperm. We now have sperm banks. 
In actual fact the female function is to explore, discover, invent, solve problems, crack jokes, make 
music—” 
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